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Abstract: 
This article assesses how legal institutions affect the influence of politically active criminal 
organizations on the human capital of elected politicians using data from over 1500 Southern 
Italian municipalities in the period 1985-2011. It exploits municipal government dissolutions 
imposed by the national government for (presumed) mafia infiltration as a source of exogenous 
variation in the presence of politically active criminal organizations. The results support 
theoretical predictions that the average education level of local politicians significantly increases 
when active mafia infiltration of local politics is remedied through the implementation of a stricter 
legal-institutional framework. 
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Organized crime has become a popular subject among social scientists in recent years. One 
side of this emerging literature focuses on the origins of criminal organizations, and points to the 
distribution of natural resources and the weakness of the institutional environment as key 
determining factors (Gambetta, 1993; Bandiera, 2003; Dimico et al., 2012; Konrad and 
Skaperdas, 2012; Buonanno et al., 2014). Another branch analyzes the consequences of 
organized crime in terms of economic growth (Pinotti, 2014), firm productivity (Albanese and 
Marinelli, 2013), government efficiency (Godson and Williams, 1998; Allum and Siebert, 2003), 
credit access (Bonaccorsi di Patti, 2009), Foreign Direct Investment (Daniele and Marani, 2011), 
money laundering (Schneider, 2010) or electoral competition (De Feo and De Luca, 2013). 
Mastrobuoni (2014) takes an interesting alternative approach by studying the economic value of 
network connections within the Italian-American mafia in the 1960s. Given the clandestine 
nature of, and key role of reputation in, criminal organizations, this provides a particularly 
appealing setting to assess the importance of social networks for economic success.  
Although often showing strong effects of criminal organizations on socio-economic outcomes, 
the mechanisms underlying these relations have received much less attention. One recent 
exception is the theoretical framework of Dal Bó et al. (2006). They show that the ability of 
‘pressure groups’ to offer bribes to, or impart punishments on, politicians is inversely related to 
elected politicians’ quality (measured by their ability). This clearly reflects one potential 
explanation for poorer economic outcomes in areas where organized crime (which represents one 
possible ‘pressure group’ that may resort to bribes and punishments) is most prevalent and 
politically active. Dal Bó et al. (2006) also illustrate, however, that the strength/weakness of the 
institutional framework is crucial. Indeed, the negative relation between pressure groups and 
political quality weakens when law enforcement strengthens – suggesting that the negative 
political (and thereby economic) effects of organized crime can be mitigated by an appropriate 
institutional framework.  
The former prediction – i.e. a negative relation between bribe-and-punishment pressure groups 
and politicians’ quality – has obtained some empirical support. Acemoglu et al. (2013), for 
instance, use Columbian data to illustrate that political parties obtaining more votes in areas 
where paramilitaries are concentrated see more of their politicians arrested for illegal activities. 
Pinotti (2013) employs southern Italian data to show that increased activity of criminal 
organizations prior to elections is associated with lower human capital of elected politicians, and 
an increased probability that these politicians later become involved in scandals.1 Relative to 
these articles, we provide two main contributions. First, although our analysis allows indirect 
inferences regarding the negative relation between organized crime and politicians’ quality, our 
main focus lies on assessing whether improved law enforcement affects not only criminal 
organizations’ development (discussed in the previous literature; see above), but also their 
societal impact. Second, we exploit arguably exogenous variation in law enforcement to identify 
the causal effect of organized crime on political quality.  
Our empirical analysis relies on data from Italian municipalities over the period 1985-2011, 
which brings three crucial advantages. First, the presence and activity of organized crime varies 
across both time and space in Italy, which provides crucial geographical and temporal variation 
to be exploited (see also Pinotti, 2013). Second, since 1991, when there is the presumption of ties 
between local politicians and organized crime, Italian local governments can be dissolved by the 
national government and replaced by a group of three commissioners. These govern the 
 
1  Pinotti (2013) uses the general, rather than the mafia-related homicide rate (which are collected separately in 
Italy; see below). This might, however, induce biased inferences since mafia and non-mafia related crime rates 
need not be positively correlated (see, for instance, Buonanno et al.’s (2014) use of non-mafia related crime rates 
as a falsification – rather than verification – test). 
municipality for the next 12-24 months, after which a new local government is elected and takes 
office (i.e. law no. 164/1991). Since the effectuation of such dissolution reflects a strengthening 
of law enforcement and arguably weakens the political influence of organized crime, this legal 
framework allows a direct test of the Dal Bó et al. (2006) model. Finally, since any dissolution is 
imposed by the Italian national government, it can reasonably be treated as exogenous with 
respect to local jurisdictions (for a similar argument in a different setting, see Geys, 2006) and 
form the basis of a difference-in-differences identification strategy. In particular, we can assess 
politicians’ human capital before and after a municipal government’s dissolution, and compare 
this evolution with municipalities where no dissolution took place. 
Our main results indicate that the dissolution of a local government due to mafia infiltration 
induces a significant upward shift in the average education level of local politicians after the 
commissioners step down and a new elected government takes office. This finding is robust to 
different specifications of the control group, and does not materialize in a placebo test using 
local government dissolutions unrelated to mafia infiltration. Interestingly, the effects are 
strongest for mayors (‘Sindaco’) and aldermen (‘Assessore’), but only approach statistical 
significance at conventional levels for ordinary council members (‘Consigliere’). This strongly 
suggests that mafia infiltration mainly affects those members of local governments that most 
directly hold the power to affect local public policy decisions. Finally, using Granger causality 
tests and information on mafia-related homicides (measured at the province level due to lack of 
more detailed statistics) over the period 2000-2010, we establish more firmly that causality runs 
from organized crime to political quality: i.e. the historical prevalence of mafia-related 
homicides significantly negatively affects the current education level of local politicians, but 
historical education levels of politicians have no significant effect on mafia-related homicides. 
Overall, therefore, we find that the institutional framework – and, in particular, improved law 
enforcement – affects not only the origins of criminal organizations (Gambetta, 1993; Bandiera, 
2003; Dimico et al., 2012; Konrad and Skaperdas, 2012; Buonanno et al., 2014), but also their 
political (and thereby economic) consequences. 
The next section briefly discusses the theoretical background of our analysis. Then, we present 
the data and empirical strategy employed. Our main results are summarized in the penultimate 
section, while the final section provides a concluding discussion. 
 
1. Theoretical Framework 
In order to derive empirically testable hypotheses, this section briefly summarizes the main 
aspects of Dal Bó et al.’s (2006) Plata o Plomo model that are relevant for our empirical analysis 
(further details and proofs can be found in Dal Bó et al., 2006). Imagine a two-stage game where 
in the first stage individuals choose to run for public office or take up a private-sector job. This 
decision is determined by the relative payoff from working in the private sector (which equals a 
wage level determined by their ability) or the public sector (which depends on the public-sector 
wage, bribes, punishments and the cost of corruption to politicians).2 In the second stage, 
politicians have discretionary power over public policies and can direct public resources to 
pressure groups – including, but not necessarily limited to, organized crime – via a lump sum 
transfer. To obtain such transfers, pressure groups can decide to influence (or not) politicians 
through bribes and/or threats of punishment, both of which are costly activities (reflecting, for 
instance, the quality of institutions and law enforcement, see also below) and are presented as a 
 
2 The cost of corruption to politicians can be interpreted as deriving from fear of detection, moral doubts or secrecy 
costs (Dal Bó et al., 2006). 
take-it-or-leave-it offer. For simplicity, politicians believe any offer of bribes and/or punishment 
to be fully credible (e.g., because of the reputation of the criminal organization; Konrad and 
Skaperdas, 1997). 
In the absence of pressure groups or when these groups remain inactive, the payoff in the 
public sector is simply the public-sector wage. If there are active pressure groups, politicians’ 
payoff may become supplemented with bribes, punishments and the cost of corruption to 
politicians. Realizing that the pressure group chooses the level of bribes and punishments to 
maximize its expected profit, the politician can predict his/her equilibrium payoffs in any 
conceivable situation (i.e. presence/absence of pressure group, and accept/reject bribe), and can 
employ this to decide whether or not to enter politics. Following this decision, there is a 
recruitment process (e.g. an election) under which the politician with the highest ability is 
selected from among the available candidates (Dal Bó et al., 2006). Clearly, the pressure groups 
will only be active if this brings positive expected profit. Note also that the ‘tools’ available to 
pressure groups in this model – i.e. bribes and punishments – make an interpretation in terms of 
organized crime (rather than, say, trade unions) realistic. 
It is of interest to note at this point that pressure groups are assumed not to influence the 
(s)election process (Dal Bó et al., 2006). In reality, it appears unlikely that pressure groups 
would remain passive until the politician is (s)elected, but rather might try to actively support 
their preferred candidate through, for instance, vote buying, intimidation activities or bribing 
election officials (Binder, 2007; Sberna, 2011; De Feo and De Luca, 2013; Pinotti, 2013). Still, 
pressure groups are likely to prefer a politician that is sufficiently easy to bribe, but nonetheless 
has a sufficiently high probability to win. As the latter is related to the quality of the candidate, 
the selection function of the pressure group will be an increasing function of politicians’ ability. 
This is important since Dal Bó et al. (2006, p. 44n) state that their results “hold under any 
selection process where the expected ability of the selected politician depends positively on the 
highest ability among applicants”. 
In the absence of pressure groups, or when such groups remain inactive, the equilibrium 
public-sector payoff to potential political entrants will be higher than their expected equilibrium 
payoff in the presence of such an (active) pressure group. This is true regardless of whether the 
politicians accepts or rejects the bribe, because an active pressure group will optimally set the 
bribe equal to the cost of corruption to the politician minus the punishment. As a result, 
politicians will incur the same total cost from taking either the bribe (with the associated cost of 
corruption) or the punishment. As individuals with an ability level above the equilibrium public-
sector payoff do not run for public office (since they can obtain a wage equal to their ability level 
in the private sector; see also Caselli and Morelli, 2004), active pressure groups – such as 
organized crime – depress the quality of elected politicians. This result is presented as 
Proposition 3 in Dal Bó et al. (2006). 
Nevertheless, as mentioned above, a pressure group will not be actively engaging with 
politicians if bribes and punishments are not profitable. A strengthening of law enforcement 
arguably makes it more difficult, and thus more costly, to punish honest politicians who refuse 
bribes. In equilibrium, pressure groups then not only become politically active less often, but 
also reduce punishments and offer higher bribes. Both actions increase the expected payoff in the 
public sector, which improves the quality of elected politicians. This result is presented as 
Proposition 6 in Dal Bó et al. (2006). 
 
2. Data and Estimation Strategy 
2.1. Institutional Framework and Data 
To assess the key theoretical prediction in section 1 – i.e. improved law enforcement against 
politically active criminal organizations increases the quality of elected politicians – we 
construct a dataset including yearly observations for more than 1500 Italian municipalities over 
the period 1985-2011. We thereby focus on municipalities in the four South-Italian regions 
where mafia organizations have traditionally been concentrated (i.e. Calabria, Campania, Puglia 
and Sicilia). This restricts the set of municipalities included to those that are sufficiently 
comparable except for the fact that organized crime became active, or remained inactive, in the 
political sphere in a given jurisdiction. This is not only critical from a theoretical perspective, but 
also because our identification strategy relies on the comparison of municipalities with active 
mafia infiltration in the political process to a sufficiently similar control group. By restricting the 
sample to Southern Italy, we effectively work with a “more homogenous sample for those 
unobserved characteristics (political culture, social capital) (…) that can affect the estimation” 
(Sberna, 2011, p. 15). We will, however, return to the selection of the control group in more 
detail below (see section 3.2.). 
To measure active mafia infiltration in the political process, we rely on a unique emergency 
measure imposed by the Italian national government in 1991 (see also Buonanno et al., 2014). 
Following a period of intense mafia-related killings, the Italian government enacted a law aimed 
at preventing or breaking ties between organized crime and (local) politicians (i.e. law no. 
164/1991). The law states that the national government can impose the dissolution of any local 
government whenever direct or indirect links emerge between local elected politicians and 
criminal organizations, or when there are undue pressures which influence or compromise the 
normal functioning of the local administration. Any proposal to dissolve a local government 
derives from a parliamentary commission (the ‘Commissione Parlamentare Antimafia’) within 
the Ministry of Interior, and must be approved by the President of the Republic and the 
government cabinet. After formal approval, three commissioners are assigned to manage the 
local government during the next 12-24 months. At the end of this period, elections are 
organized to select a new local government. The inauguration of this new government brings 
about the discharge of the commissioners. 
Since the introduction of the law, it has been invoked well over 200 times. As can be seen in 
figure 1, where we display the number of local government dissolutions per year since the law’s 
initiation, the number of dissolutions shows substantial variation over time even though there is 
some clustering when the measure first became available (we return to this below). Note also 
that the law was invoked only four times in municipalities outside the four South-Italian regions 
included in our analysis. Within these four regions, however, just under 10% of all municipalities 
have witnessed at least one dissolution of their local government for mafia infiltration (31 
municipalities faced two dissolutions). 
__________________________ 
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
__________________________ 
Municipalities seeing their government dissolved are those where the mafia is actively 
politically involved and law enforcement against such infiltration visibly strengthens. Hence, we 
rely on official information – publicly available from the Italian Parliament’s Commissione 
Parlamentare Antimafia – regarding local governments’ temporary dissolutions to set up a direct 
test of whether there is an increase in politicians’ human capital after the application of law no. 
164/1991.  
It is important to observe, however, that the application of the law is likely to be imperfect. On 
the one hand, some local governments with mafia infiltration may not be detected and dissolved. 
Fortunately, our identification does not require that all mafia-infiltrated governments are 
effectively dissolved. Unobserved relations between criminal organizations and local politicians 
imply that such municipalities remain in the ‘control’ group (i.e., those without government 
dissolutions). This will bias our estimates on the effect of increased law enforcement towards 
zero. On the other hand, some local governments without mafia infiltration may be dissolved 
erroneously. In this case, the government is reinstated as soon as the mis-identification is 
verified, and these temporary dissolutions are treated as if they did not occur in our dataset. Yet, 
as before, uncorrected erroneous dissolutions are unproblematic for our identification since, by 
remaining in the ‘treatment’ group, these will again bias our point estimates towards zero. In 
other words, to the extent that some mafia-infiltrated governments no doubt escape detection and 
dissolution, and others surely were dissolved without good grounds, this creates a strong test-
case to uncover the (lower bound of the) structural effects of interest. 
2.2. Estimation Strategy 
As mentioned, our estimation approach is based on a difference-in-differences (DiD) 
framework. We compare municipalities with and without mafia infiltration before and after such 
infiltration is terminated by the national government to estimate the causal impact of tightened 
law enforcement against organized crime on politicians’ human capital. Unlike the traditional 
DiD model, which relies on a shock at one point in time across all treated jurisdictions, we can 
exploit the fact that dissolutions did not take place at the same point in time for each 
municipality (see figure 1) to further strengthen our identification (Angrist and Pischke, 2008). 
This indeed allows us to more rigorously separate the effect of the treatment – i.e. dissolutions 
due to (presumed) links to organized crime under law no. 164/1991 – from possibly unobserved 
time-specific events. We have the following baseline specification (with subscript i referring to 
municipalities and subscript t to time): 
 
𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝐵𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  (1) 
 
The central dependent variable (𝑌𝑖,𝑡) employed throughout most of the analysis below is the 
average number of years of education of all members of the local government – including 
council members (‘Consigliere’), aldermen (‘Assessore’) and the (vice)mayor (‘Sindaco’) – 
within municipality i at time t. Nonetheless, as this may conceal possibly interesting 
heterogeneity of the studied effects across different subsets of local politicians, we also run 
equation (1) independently for council members, aldermen and the mayor. In this case, 𝑌𝑖,𝑡  
equals the average number of years of education of local politicians within a given subgroup.  
The use of politicians’ education level follows previous work by, among others, De Paola and 
Scoppa (2010), Besley and Reynal-Querol (2011), Besley et al. (2011), Galasso and Nannincini 
(2011) and Pinotti (2013). It reflects the idea that human capital is a valid proxy for individuals’ 
ability and skills, which is used as a measure for quality in the theoretical section (see also Dal 
Bó et al., 2006). While this is widely acknowledged in studies of private sector activities (Black 
and Lynch, 1996; Hitt et al., 2001), a similar connection is gaining increasing prominence also 
with respect to public sector activities (Besley and Reynal-Querol, 2011). The average education 
level of local politicians is calculated on an annual basis using data provided by the Italian 
Ministry of Interior. The original dataset (available 
at http://amministratori.interno.it/AmmIndex5.htm) provides the highest degree a politician 
obtained. To calculate the average education level across all politicians in a given municipality 
and year, we follow De Paola and Scoppa (2010) and Baltrunaite et al. (2014) in translating 
degrees into the minimum number of years necessary to obtain them (assuming an uninterrupted 
education path): i.e. no education = 0 years; primary education = 5 years; lower secondary = 8 
years; higher secondary = 13 years; university or more = 18 years. For missing values on 
politicians’ highest degree (which occurred in just over 2% of the sample), we tried to infer their 
education level from their profession. Whenever this was impossible due to missing information, 
unemployment, etc. we coded the observation as missing (1.84% of the sample).3 
In all specifications, 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 and 𝛼𝑖 are a complete set of year and municipality fixed effects, the 
latter of which allow us to control for unobserved heterogeneity across municipalities – also 
among those dissolved for mafia infiltration (see also De Witte et al., 2014). Finally, Trendi,t 
reflects a complete set of (linear) municipality-specific time trends. The reason for their 
inclusion is that a key identifying assumption of the DiD approach used here is that the temporal 
development of each municipality would have been the same in the absence of any treatment. 
Including municipality-specific time trends controls for any potential differential temporal 
developments independent of the treatment. While we use a linear time trend in the main 
analysis, a more flexible functional form of the time trend including squared and cubed terms 
 
3  In many cases, attribution of an education level to a given professional denomination was constrained by the fact 
that some professional categories were defined very broadly, and thus contained individuals from multiple 
education levels. We took two approaches to deal with this. First, and most conservatively, we left politicians’ 
level of education in these cases as a missing value. These results are reported in the main text. Alternatively, we 
set politicians’ level of education equal to the modal value of the level of education in that professional category in 
that year. The exact approach followed leaves our results unaffected (details upon request). 
does not affect our inferences (and, if anything, strengthens our results both in terms of point 
estimates and statistical significance; details upon request). 
The key variable of interest in the model is BeforeCommissioners, and we experimented with a 
number of different operationalizations to assess the robustness our results. In the main part of 
the analysis, this variable is set equal to one for municipalities put under commissioners in the 
entire period preceding the dissolution of the government, and zero otherwise.4 This approach 
implies that BeforeCommissioners takes value one between 1985 (the starting point of our 
dataset) and the year prior to a municipal government’s dissolution due to (presumed) mafia 
infiltration, and zero otherwise. Nevertheless, as this may introduce asymmetry across 
municipalities as years advance, our second operationalization sets BeforeCommissioners equal 
to one only in the five (or ten) years preceding the dissolution of the government, and zero 
otherwise.5 This alternate approach still imposes that the effect of mafia infiltration is time-
invariant, and estimates an average effect of mafia infiltration over the period taken into account 
(i.e. the entire period back to 1985, or the last five or ten years before government dissolution). 
Our third and final operationalization relaxes this assumption by introducing a set of year-
specific dummy variables that take value one only for municipalities put under commissioners in 
the Tth year (with T=1,…,15) preceding the dissolution of the government due to (presumed) 
mafia infiltration. This generates a more flexible functional form that allows for year-on-year 
variation in the estimated effect of mafia infiltration. Intuitively, one might expect stronger 
effects closer to the time of the government’s dissolution, since this is the time when we can be 
 
4  We exclude ten municipalities that saw their government dissolved in 2010 or 2011 to have at least one 
observation after the commissioners have left and a new government has been instated. 
5 We ran equation (1) using eleven cut-offs between five and 15 years preceding the dissolution of the local 
government. Since the results are unaffected by the actual cut-off employed, we decided to only report the five- 
and ten-year results (all other results are available upon request). 
most certain that there is active involvement of the mafia in local politics (otherwise no 
intervention by the national government would occur). Given its coding, the coefficient β1 under 
all three operationalizations estimates the reverse of the causal effect from strengthened law 
enforcement against mafia infiltration on Yi,t, and the theoretical framework in section 1 suggests 
that β1<0. Summary statistics for all variables are provided in Appendix A. 
 
3. Empirical Results 
3.1. Baseline Results 
Our main findings are brought together in table 1. The first three columns present the baseline 
results from estimating equation (1), and only differ in the exact operationalization of 
BeforeCommissioners. In column (1), it is one for municipalities put under commissioners in the 
entire period preceding the government’s dissolution. In columns (2) and (3), it is one for 
municipalities put under commissioners in, respectively, the five or ten years preceding the 
government’s dissolution. Columns (1) through (3) ignore that government dissolutions were not 
always successful in breaking ties between criminal organizations and local politicians. This is 
illustrated most forcefully by the fact that 31 municipalities in our sample had their government 
dissolved twice since 1991 (though none witnessed more than two dissolutions). Clearly, these 
municipalities may be different from the remaining sample. In columns (4) to (6), which again 
only differ in the exact operationalization of BeforeCommissioners, we therefore exclude all 31 
municipalities that witnessed repeated dissolutions from the analysis. In all cases, we report 
standard errors clustered at the municipality level (Bertrand et al., 2004). 
__________________________ 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
__________________________ 
Throughout all estimations reported in table 1, the coefficient estimate of 
BeforeCommissioners is robustly negative and statistically significant at conventional levels. In 
terms of the size of the estimated effect, the results suggest that the average education level of 
local politicians is approximately three to four months lower in the period preceding the 
dissolution of the local government, ceteris paribus, compared to what it would have been in the 
absence of mafia infiltration. The analysis therefore strongly corroborates the idea that tighter 
law enforcement removing (or, at least, reducing) mafia infiltration from local politics improves 
the average human capital of subsequently elected local politicians (as hypothesized in section 1 
above). This finding is unaffected when excluding observations in the period 1991-1993 (to 
account for the fact that these years witnessed a high number of dissolved governments) and 
when excluding each of the four regions included in our analysis one by one (details upon 
request).  
Overall, our baseline results reported in table 1 thus are in line with the idea that i) the ability 
level of politicians is reduced where organized crime is active in the political sphere and ii) this 
effect is remedied via strengthened law enforcement. Still, the results thus far do not allow for 
heterogeneity across types of politicians, nor over time.6 In table 2, we first tackle heterogeneity 
across subsets of local politicians by estimating equation (1) independently for the mayor 
(‘Sindaco’), aldermen (‘Assessore’) and council members (‘Consigliere’). Throughout table 2, 
our key explanatory variable (BeforeCommissioners) is set to one for municipalities put under 
commissioners in the entire period preceding the government’s dissolution (though the 
alternatives discussed in table 1 provide qualitatively similar results; details upon request). As 
 
6 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for pointing out a number of ways to incorporate this into our analysis. 
before, columns (1) to (3) employ the entire sample, while columns (4) to (6) exclude the 
municipalities that witnessed repeated dissolutions. 
__________________________ 
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
__________________________ 
Table 2 indicates that although we find a robust negative coefficient estimate for 
BeforeCommissioners among all three groups of politicians, this is statistically significant only 
for mayors and aldermen. The effect size for these two groups is also substantially larger than the 
overall effect estimated in table 1. In fact, the average education level of mayors as well as 
aldermen is estimated to be approximately one year lower in the period preceding the dissolution 
of the local government, ceteris paribus. For council members, the effect is constrained to 
between one and two months (and at best approaches significance at conventional levels). This 
indicates that the effects of mafia infiltration on politicians’ human capital are predominantly 
related to those members of local governments that most directly hold the power to affect local 
public policy decisions. In light of the theoretical model in section 1, this suggests that politically 
active criminal organization may specifically, and strategically, target bribes and punishments to 
more powerful politicians – rather than rank-and-file council members. 
In figure 2, we assess the extent to which our results are time-invariant by operationalizing 
BeforeCommissioners via a set of dummy variables that take value one only for municipalities 
put under commissioners in the Tth year (with T=1,…,15) preceding the government’s mafia-
related dissolution. For ease of exposition, we only display the results for all members of the 
local government even though we will discuss the results for our three subsets of politicians 
below as well (graphical representations for these groups are available upon request). 
__________________________ 
FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
__________________________ 
Figure 2 illustrates that the drop in politicians’ human capital due to mafia infiltration appears 
to be a relatively gradual process. The point estimates reflecting the effect of (presumed) mafia 
infiltration on local politicians’ average education levels show a gradual decline starting about 10 
years before the actual dissolution of the local government. The estimated impact becomes 
negative about six years prior to the government’s dissolution, and it reaches statistical 
significance at conventional levels in the last three years. This pattern confirms the intuitive 
notion that the strongest effects should appear just before the government’s dissolution, since 
this is the time when we can be most certain that there is active involvement of organized crime 
in local politics (see above). 
The negative trend in figure 2 could arguably also reflect some degree of self-selection, 
whereby local governments are particularly likely to become dissolved when the human capital 
of politicians has fallen observably (or failed to rise as much as elsewhere). The latter may be 
interpreted at the national government level as a signal of mafia interference, or may simply 
reflect the fact that politicians with lower human capital are more likely to get caught when 
engaging in illegal activities. From this perspective, it is important to point out that the temporal 
pattern in figure 2 is not replicated for mayors and aldermen. For these groups, the effect of 
organized crime is not only stronger in absolute and statistical terms (as reported in table 2 
above), but also largely constant over time. In light of our earlier observation that politically 
active criminal organization may be especially targeting more powerful politicians, the time-
invariance of the mafia effect among these politicians indicates that any possible self-selection 
issues in terms of the timing of local government dissolutions are only of minor concern. 
Moreover, any such self-selection would not affect our interpretation that a strengthening of law 
enforcement helps remedy the negative effects of mafia infiltration on local politicians’ human 
capital. 
3.2. Robustness Check using a Matched Sample of Municipalities 
Even though we restrict our sample to southern Italy in order to work with a more homogenous 
set of jurisdictions, one source of potential concern is that the sample of dissolved municipalities 
differs in some meaningful dimensions from the control group (i.e. all non-dissolved 
municipalities). In this section, we address this via a matching approach (using psmatch2 in 
Stata12; Leuven and Sianesi, 2010). Specifically, to match ‘treated’ and ‘untreated’ 
municipalities (with ‘treatment’ referring to the dissolution of the municipal government at any 
point in time), we ran a probit regression with (log) population size7, the number of mafia-related 
homicides in the province, the municipal unemployment rate (in 2001), the ratio of young-to-old 
inhabitants (i.e. number of >65 for every 100 inhabitants under age 15; also in 2001), the share 
of men and entrepreneurs in the local government and the average year of birth of local 
government officials as explanatory variables (summary statistics provided in Appendix A).8  
Then, we match the sample of municipalities where dissolution of the local government took 
place to a comparable sample where no such dissolutions took place, thereby linking each 
municipality only to its ‘nearest neighbor’ in terms of municipalities’ propensity scores. This not 
 
7  Population size is only observed during census years (i.e. 1992, 2001 and 2010). It is linearly interpolated for 
other years. 
8 The coefficient estimates suggest that larger municipal population size, more mafia-related homicides, higher 
unemployment and older council members all significantly increase the probability of government dissolution. 
The share of young relative to old inhabitants has the reverse effect. The shares of men and entrepreneurs in the 
local government have no statistically significant effect. 
only substantially restricts the size of the sample, but also induces the highest possible similarity 
in terms of the predicted probabilities of government dissolution. Importantly, the resulting 
sample displays no significant differences between the matched set of ‘treated’ and ‘untreated’ 
municipalities on the background characteristics included. Moreover, as can be seen in figure 3, 
the distributions of the estimated propensity scores for the treated group (i.e. all municipalities 
put under commissioners; right-hand side) and the control group (i.e. their ‘nearest’ neighbours 
as derived from the matching procedure; left-hand side) show substantial overlap. This indicates 
that for each treated municipality there is an untreated one with similar values for the 
background characteristics, which is a key requirement to obtain valid inferences (Wooldridge, 
2010).  
__________________________ 
FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE 
__________________________ 
The results in table 3 replicate the analysis in table 1 for this matched subsample of 
municipalities. The findings are broadly in line with those reported above. If anything, both the 
point estimates for β1 and, despite the substantially reduced sample size, the precision with 
which these are estimated improve.  
__________________________ 
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
__________________________ 
3.3. Placebo Test using Government Dissolutions Unrelated to Mafia Infiltration 
One important concern related to our results thus far is that they might be driven by a local 
government’s dissolution as such, rather than the mafia infiltration which this dissolution is 
meant to resolve. The reason is that education levels gradually increase over the 1985-2011 
period. Assuming that politicians’ education levels are fixed at the time they take up political 
office, this implies that the average education level of elected politicians in any public assembly 
(which remains constant between elections) tends to start lagging behind this upward societal 
trend. Moreover, although elections are likely to induce a partial re-adjustment,9 a low 
replacement rate (i.e. few new politicians entering office during elections) would lead this 
‘quality gap’ to gradually increase over time. When the dissolution of a local government 
induces an unusually high replacement rate – in the sense that fewer members of the ‘old’ 
political guard reappear in subsequent governments – our results thus far might arise simply 
from the ‘catch-up’ effect inherent in government dissolutions. 
Two pieces of evidence suggest, however, that such catching up is not driving our results. The 
first comes from analysing the average tenure of politicians in South-Italian municipalities, and 
the rate at which these are typically replaced. Using information from all 135,457 local 
politicians active in our four southern Italian regions in the 1985-2011 period, we find that these 
generally have very short tenures. No less than 71.02% leave local politics within the space of 
one five-year term, while 90.88% leave within 10 years. Excluding politicians where the bounds 
of our observation period create uncertainty concerning their actual number of years in office 
 
9  Auxiliary regressions indicate that this indeed the case. The average education level of elected politicians in our 
sample increases with roughly 2.5 months after an election has taken place, ceteris paribus. It is important to 
note, however, that controlling for this post-election readjustment does not affect our main results (details upon 
request). 
(N=95,540) provides similar results (i.e. 77.27% are politically active at the local level for five 
years of less, 94.34% for 10 years or less).10 This low average tenure is not due to dissolutions 
for mafia infiltration, since excluding politicians from such municipalities (N=115,503) still 
indicates that 70.35% of local officials abandon local politics in five years or less (90.45% in 10 
years or less).  
These low tenures naturally correspond to a relatively high turnover rate: on average, 11.91% 
of local politicians resign from their position per year (mostly around elections, when the 
average municipality sees 47.51% of local officials replaced).11 More importantly, however, 
prior to the dissolution of their government for mafia infiltration, the average turnover rate in 
mafia-connected municipalities (10.93%) is not significantly different from that in all other 
municipalities (11.74%) (p<0.10). These observations are important since low tenure / high 
turnover implies that the ‘quality gap’ between elected politicians and the upward societal trend 
in education is likely to remain reasonably small. This leaves little space for a ‘catching-up’ 
explanation of our main results. 
The second piece of evidence derives from the fact that Italian local governments may be 
dissolved also for reasons unrelated to mafia infiltration (e.g., resignation of the mayor, 
resignation of more than 50% of council members, etc.). In fact, such dissolutions are fairly 
common. More than 1000 occurrences are recorded during our time period, and 616 of the 
municipalities in our sample (circa 38%) witness at least one dissolution of their local 
government unrelated to mafia infiltration. If our results are due to the dissolution of a local 
government as such, rather than mafia infiltration, one would expect to see an upward shock in 
 
10  Mayors tend to be an exception, as tenures beyond 10 or even 20 years appear more common for them. 
11  Note that we removed the first election after any type of local government dissolution from this calculation as 
there are, strictly speaking, no politicians to be replaced in such circumstances. 
political quality after any type of government dissolution. This is evaluated in table 4. Since we 
are unfortunately unable to distinguish between different reasons for government dissolution 
(beyond their link to the mafia), we here treat all non-mafia dissolutions as one group. 
Following, respectively, columns (1) and (4) in table 1, column (1) includes all available 
observations whereas municipalities with multiple non-mafia government dissolutions were 
excluded in column (2). 
__________________________ 
TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
__________________________ 
The results indicate that local government dissolutions due to factors unrelated to mafia 
infiltration have no significant effect on the average education level of politicians in that 
municipality. The same also holds when replicating these regressions separately for mayors, 
aldermen and councillors (details available upon request). This strongly suggests that the 
increase in politicians’ human capital observed for dissolutions related to mafia infiltration in 
tables 1, 2 and 3 is not due to the dissolution of the local government as such.  
3.4. Causality 
While the theoretical discussion in section 1 predicts a link that runs from mafia activity to 
politicians’ human capital, it might also be that causality runs from the human capital of 
politicians to mafia infiltration because human capital is often argued to play an essential role in 
the fight against corruption (Glaeser and Saks, 2005). In this section, we employ Granger 
causality tests with panel fixed effects to further assess the direction of the causal arrow (Hall et 
al., 2001).  
Specifically, we regress each endogenous variable – i.e. mafia activity and politicians’ human 
capital – on past values of the other endogenous variable, controlling for its own past values. As 
such analysis is by construction unfeasible using the indicator variable for the presence/absence 
of government dissolution (as it occurs at one fixed point in time), we here rely on a time-
varying measure of mafia activity: i.e. mafia-related homicides as reported by the Servizio di 
Indagine (SDI) and downloaded from the website of the Italian Statistical Office (ISTAT).12 We 
prefer this dataset to that reported by the Ministry of Justice as the latter only records crimes 
prosecuted, not all crimes reported by the three main Italian police forces. Moreover, as Italian 
police forces have recorded felonies committed by criminal organizations separately since 1983 
(though we were able to obtain these data only from 2000 onwards), we can restrict attention to 
mafia violence and avoid measurement error due to up- and downswings in the homicide rate 
unrelated to mafia activity (see also Buonanno et al., 2014). Note also that we use the mafia-
related homicide rate as this most clearly signals the presence of the mafia in a specific area 
(unlike, say, property seized from the mafia), and is less likely to be biased due to under-
reporting (as occurs for indicators of theft, robbery and extortion; Sberna, 2011). It is also linked 
to the theoretical model in section 1, since – even though the mafia is sometimes argued to be 
strongest when it need not resort to violence – an increase in the mafia-related homicide rate may 
serve to buttress the credibility of bribe-and-punishment offers made to politicians (Konrad and 
Skaperdas, 1997; for evidence from Italian elections, see Sberna, 2011; Pinotti, 2013). 
The estimation model here takes the following form: 
𝛥𝑌𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 + βY𝑖,𝑡−5 + φX�𝑖,(𝑡−5;𝑡) + 𝜗𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + ω𝑖,𝑡 (2) 
 
12 http://giustiziaincifre.istat.it/Nemesis/jsp/dawinci.jsp?q=pl02a0030044200&an=2004&ig=1&ct=342&id=4A|18A 
𝛥𝑋𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛿𝑖 + γX𝑖,𝑡−5 + θY𝑖,𝑡−5 + 𝜌𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + µ𝑖,𝑡 (3) 
 
where 𝑌𝑖,𝑡 is the average education level of municipal politicians in province i at time t and 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 
is the mafia-related homicide rate. Both equations contain a complete set of time and province 
fixed effects, and we employ robust standard errors to control for heteroskedasticity. Note that 
we specify a five-year lag since new municipal elections normally take place every five years in 
Italy, such that a five-year lag guarantees that we do not include the same municipal government 
more than once in the estimation.13 As a result, the dependent variables are 𝛥𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑌𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑌𝑖,𝑡−5 
and 𝛥𝑋𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑋𝑖,𝑡−5, respectively. The key independent variable is the average number of 
mafia-related homicides over the last 5 years in equation (2)14 and the average education level of 
the previous government in equation (3). 
__________________________ 
TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
__________________________ 
The results are presented in table 5, and indicate that the historical prevalence of mafia-related 
homicides significantly negatively affects the current education level of municipal politicians 
(even after controlling for the historical level of politicians’ human capital), whereas historical 
education levels have no significant effect upon mafia-related homicides. Consequently, mafia-
related violence appears to cause, in the Granger sense, a decrease in politicians’ human capital. 
These results are obviously constrained by the short time dimension (i.e. 2000-2010) and 
 
13 Remember also that the replacement rate of politicians during elections is very high in South-Italian local politics 
(see section 3.3.), which helps our identification here. 
14 We introduce a five-year average to accommodate the five-year period between municipal elections, and to avoid 
that year-specific changes in the mafia-related homicide rate bias our findings. 
relatively high level of aggregation of our data (i.e. province rather than municipality). 
Nonetheless, they provide at least suggestive initial evidence on the causal direction of the link 
between organized crime and the human capital of elected politicians. 
3.5. Government Dissolution and Subsequent Government Composition 
Finally, one might wonder whether other observable characteristics of politicians – beyond 
their education level – are likewise affected by government dissolutions for (presumed) mafia 
infiltration. In table 6, we therefore briefly look at three additional socio-demographic 
characteristics of the politicians in our sample: i.e. age (measured via politicians’ year of birth), 
gender (1 if male) and professional activity as an entrepreneur. Age and sex are included to 
assess the intuitive idea that the existing political class (which, in our setting, is mostly male) 
tends to be replaced following a scandal by a new, ‘untainted’ set of politicians. While these new 
politicians are, almost by definition, likely to be younger, one might also expect a gender shift if 
male politicians are tainted much more by the revealed links to organized crime of some of their 
colleagues. The last characteristic – i.e. entrepreneurs – is included since recent work has 
indicated that businessmen and -women enter into politics more often in circumstances where 
they can more easily extract rents (Rosenson, 2006; Gehlbach et al., 2010).  
While the average year of birth of local government members allows using the same DiD 
model as before (see equation (1)), the nature of the dependent variables for gender and 
entrepreneurs (i.e. their shares among local officials) requires an estimation technique that 
accommodates censoring. As panel tobit estimators do not allow the inclusion of municipality 
fixed effects, we rely on a random effects model and include a number of additional (largely 
time-invariant) control variables: namely, (log) population size, the municipal unemployment 
rate and average education level (both in 2001), the ratio of young-to-old inhabitants (i.e. number 
of >65 for every 100 inhabitants under age 15; also in 2001) and a complete set of province 
indicator variables. We also include an indicator variable (MafiaInfiltration) for municipalities 
suspected of mafia infiltration sometime during our observation window (1985-2011), which is 
intended to capture any (un)observed way these towns may differ from all other municipalities.  
__________________________ 
TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE 
__________________________ 
The results are brought together in table 6. The dataset here contains only municipalities that 
have at some point been put under commissioners and their ‘nearest’ neighbour as derived from 
a matching procedure (as in table 3). The analysis indicates that local government dissolution 
due to mafia infiltration appears to have had a statistically significant impact on the average age 
of local elected politicians (column (1)). The substantive impact, however, is rather weak as the 
average age is lowered by approximately one year. We also observe a significant effect on the 
share of entrepreneurs in municipal politics (column (2)). Governments dissolved for (presumed) 
mafia infiltration appear to have weakly fewer entrepreneurs before the dissolution (0.070 – 
0.149 = –0.079; p<0.10), but significantly fewer entrepreneurs after a new government is 
(s)elected and takes office (–0.149; p<0.05). Finally, and interestingly, a very similar effect is 
observed for the share of male politicians. That is, there is no statistically significant effect on 
the share of male politicians before the government’s dissolution (0.073 – 0.110 = –0.037; 
p>0.10). However, following the (s)election and inauguration of a new government, the share of 
male politicians is significantly lower (–0.110; p<0.05) – even after controlling for the positive 
time trend in female representation in Italian local politics within our time period. One potential 
explanation is that male politicians, who have traditionally dominated Italian politics (Baltrunaite 
et al., 2014), are tainted much more by the unveiled links to organized crime of some of their 
colleagues. Taken together, these findings suggest that the population in municipalities subjected 
to government dissolution tended to shift their votes to a larger degree than observed in other 
southern Italian municipalities towards younger, female and non-entrepreneurial candidates.  
It is important to point out that these compositional changes are not driving the educational 
effects observed above. Indeed, when including the share of female politicians and entrepreneurs 
as well as the average year of birth of local politicians directly into the models presented in 
tables 1 and 3, the coefficient estimate of β1 remains of similar magnitude and its statistical 
significance is unaffected (details upon request). 
 
4. Conclusion 
Although various scholars have investigated the economic effects of organized crime (Godson 
and Williams, 1998; Allum and Siebert, 2003; Bonaccorsi di Patti, 2009; Schneider, 2010; 
Daniele and Marani, 2011; Pinotti, 2014), analyses of their political consequences have remained 
scant (for recent exceptions, see Sberna, 2011; Acemoglu et al., 2013; Pinotti, 2013). Moreover, 
while research on the origins of organized crime has placed key significance to the institutional 
framework (see Gambetta, 1993; Bandiera, 2003; Dimico et al., 2012; Konrad and Skaperdas, 
2012; Buonanno et al., 2014), such institutional focus has remained under-developed in the 
empirical literature assessing the economic and/or political consequences of organized crime.  
This article exploited the theoretical work by Dal Bó et al. (2006) to evaluate how institutions 
– and, in particular, improved law enforcement – weaken the negative relation between 
politically active bribe-and-punishment pressure groups and politicians’ human capital. Our main 
results – using data on more than 1500 Southern Italian municipalities over the period 1985-2011 
– confirm that the average education level of local politicians is significantly increased after law 
enforcement tightens (measured via local government dissolution due to active mafia infiltration 
in the political process under law no. 164/1991). This increase in politicians’ education level is 
estimated at around 4 months, which represents approximately 2.5 percent of the average 
education level observed in the data (i.e. 13.11 years) or circa 20% of its standard deviation. 
Interestingly, however, the effect is substantially stronger – i.e. approximately one year of 
education – among mayors and aldermen, which are the groups of politicians that de facto hold 
most power in the local arena. 
Using local government dissolutions unrelated to mafia infiltration as a placebo test, we verify 
that the above effect is specific to, and driven by, exogenously imposed mafia-related local 
government dissolutions. Hence, we provide strong support for the idea that institutions matter 
not only for criminal organizations’ development, but also for their societal impact (e.g., in terms 
of the human capital of local office-holders). We also find that in response to the dissolution of 
their governments, populations of these municipalities tended to shift their votes to a larger 
degree than observed elsewhere in South-Italian municipalities towards younger, female and 
non-entrepreneurial candidates. 
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Table 1: Baseline Estimation Results 
 Dependent Variable: Average years of education 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Before Commissioners -0.323*** -0.265*** -0.209** -0.337** -0.277*** -0.205** 
 (-2.58) (-3.29) (-2.44) (-2.41) (-3.11) (-2.24) 
Municipality FE 
Municipal time trends 
Year FE 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
R2 within 49.15 49.17 49.14 49.01 49.02 49.00 
N 39040 39040 39040 38432 38432 38432 
Municipalities 1572 1572 1572 1541 1541 1541 
Note: The table shows the results from a difference-in-difference regression analysis using local elected politicians’ 
years of education averaged over all council members and (vice)mayor as dependent variable. 
BeforeCommissioners takes three different forms. In columns (1) and (4), it is one for municipalities put under 
commissioners in the entire period preceding the government’s dissolution, and zero otherwise. In columns (2) 
and (5), it is one for municipalities put under commissioners in the five years preceding the government’s 
dissolution, and zero otherwise. In columns (3) and (6), it is one for municipalities put under commissioners in 
the ten years preceding the government’s dissolution, and zero otherwise. t-statistics based on standard errors 
adjusted for clustering at municipality level in brackets. Complete dataset employed in columns (1), (2) and (3), 
while municipalities with two government dissolutions were removed in columns (4), (5) and (6). * p<0.10; ** 
p<0.05; *** p<0.01. 
 
 
  
Table 2: Heterogeneity across Local Politicians 
 Dependent Variable: Average years of education 
 (1) 
Mayor 
(2) 
Aldermen 
(3) 
Councilor 
(4) 
Mayor 
(5) 
Aldermen 
(6) 
Councilor 
Before Commissioners -1.046*** -0.933*** -0.131 -1.040*** -0.900*** -0.183 
 (-2.94) (-3.65) (-0.99) (-2.58) (-3.14) (-1.22) 
Municipality FE 
Municipal time trends 
Year FE 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
R2 within 31.73 27.30 48.27 31.49 27.09 48.18 
N 36595 37393 38479 36042 36809 37873 
Municipalities 1572 1572 1572 1541 1541 1541 
Note: The table shows the results from a difference-in-difference regression analysis using local elected politicians’ 
years of education (averaged within each subset of politicians) as dependent variable. BeforeCommissioners it is 
one for municipalities put under commissioners in the entire period preceding the government’s dissolution, and 
zero otherwise. t-statistics based on standard errors adjusted for clustering at municipality level in brackets. 
Complete dataset employed in columns (1), (2) and (3), while municipalities with two government dissolutions 
were removed in columns (4), (5) and (6). * p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. 
 
 
  
Table 3: A Sample of Matched Municipalities 
 Dependent Variable: Average years of education 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Before Commissioners -0.377*** -0.310*** -0.236** -0.396*** -0.321*** -0.237** 
 (-2.69) (-3.59) (-2.54) (-2.60) (-3.47) (-2.43) 
Municipality FE 
Municipal time trends 
Year FE 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
R2 within 48.89 49.00 48.83 47.80 47.92 47.73 
N 5742 5742 5742 5225 5225 5225 
Municipalities 249 249 249 222 222 222 
Note: The table shows the results from a difference-in-difference regression analysis using local elected politicians’ 
years of education averaged over all council members and (vice)mayor as dependent variable. 
BeforeCommissioners takes three different forms. In columns (1) and (4), it is one for municipalities put under 
commissioners in the entire period preceding the government’s dissolution, and zero otherwise. In columns (2) 
and (5), it is one for municipalities put under commissioners in the five years preceding the government’s 
dissolution, and zero otherwise. In columns (3) and (6), it is one for municipalities put under commissioners in 
the ten years preceding the government’s dissolution, and zero otherwise. t-statistics based on standard errors 
adjusted for clustering at municipality level in brackets. Municipalities with two government dissolutions were 
removed in columns (4), (5) and (6). * p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. 
 
  
Table 4: Dissolutions Unrelated to Mafia Infiltration 
 Dependent Variable: Average years of education 
 (1) (2) 
Before Non-mafia Dissolution 0.047 0.018 
 (0.79) (0.25) 
Municipality FE 
Municipal time trends 
Year FE 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
R2 within 49.12 49.24 
N 39191 34919 
Municipalities 1609 1420 
Note: The table shows the results from a difference-in-difference regression analysis using local 
elected politicians’ years of education averaged over all council members and (vice)mayor as 
dependent variable. Before Non-mafia Dissolution is one in the entire period preceding a 
local government’s dissolution for reasons unrelated to Mafia infiltration, and zero otherwise. 
t-statistics based on standard errors adjusted for clustering at municipality level in brackets. 
Complete dataset employed in column (1), while municipalities with multiple non-Mafia 
government dissolutions were removed in column (2). * p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. 
 
 
  
Table 5: Granger Causality Tests 
 5-Year change in 
average education level 
5-Year change in 
mafia homicides 
Mean mafia homicides (last 5 years) -0.005*** 
(-2.27) 
- 
Mean education level (last 5 years) - 0.096 
(0.06) 
Education level (t-5) -0.671*** 
(-14.08) 
- 
Mafia homicide (t-5) - 0.618*** 
(6.01) 
Province FE 
Year FE 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
R2 within 36.19 31.20 
N 250 269 
Note: Dependent variables are indicated in the top row of the table. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard 
errors are employed throughout. t-statistics between brackets:* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. 
 
  
Table 6: Effect on Subsequent Government Composition 
 Birth year Share entrepreneurs Share Male 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Before Commissioners -1.170** 0.070* 0.073*** 
 (-2.30) (1.94) (2.69) 
MafiaInfiltration - -0.149** 
(-2.33) 
-0.110** 
(-2.39) 
Constant - -2.150 1.638*** 
  (-0.01) (5.22) 
Municipality FE 
Municipal time trends 
Year FE 
Controls 
YES 
YES 
YES 
NO 
NO 
YES 
YES 
YES 
NO 
YES 
YES 
YES 
R2 within 
Wald 
63.01  
350.4*** 
 
562.9*** 
N 5495 5105 4651 
Municipalities 249 249 249 
Note: Dependent variables: Average birth-year of members of local government (column (1)), Share of 
entrepreneurs in local government (column (2)), Share of men in local government (column (3)). The variable of 
interest is BeforeCommissioners, which is one for municipalities put under commissioners in the entire period 
preceding the government’s dissolution, and zero otherwise. MafiaInfiltration is an indicator variable for 
municipalities put under commissioners. Controls includes an indicator variable for province, (log) population 
size, municipal education and unemployment level and the share of young relative to old inhabitants. Dataset 
only includes municipalities put under commissioners and their ‘nearest’ neighbour as derived from a matching 
procedure. Due to the nature of the data, column (1) derives from a difference-in-difference regression with fixed 
effects and standard errors adjusted for clustering at municipality level , while columns (2) and (3) rely on panel 
tobit with random effects. t-statistics in brackets. * p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. 
 
  
Fig. 1: Local Governments Dissolved for (Suspected) Mafia Infiltration, 1991-2012 
 
Note: Data up to 2007 derive from the website of the Italian Parliament “Commissione Parlamentare Antimafia” 
(http://www.camera.it/_bicamerali/leg15/commbicantimafia/documentazionetematica/23/schedabase.asp). The 
remaining years were manually collected by the authors. 
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Fig. 2: Results by Time Before Dissolution 
 
Note: The figure shows the results from a difference-in-difference regression analysis using local 
elected politicians’ years of education averaged over all council members and (vice)mayor as 
dependent variable. The key explanatory variables are a set of indicator variables equal to one for 
municipalities put under commissioners in year t-i (with i=1,…,15), where t is the year of the 
government’s dissolution. This effectively provides a more flexible specification of equation (1), 
allowing for year-on-year variation in the variable measuring the effect of mafia infiltration (i.e., 
BeforeCommissioners in table 1). Coefficient estimates and 90% confidence intervals are provided. 
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Fig. 3: Overlap in Propensity Scores in Treated and Matched Samples 
 
Note: The figure presents the distributions of the estimated propensity scores of mafia infiltration for the treated 
group (i.e. all municipalities put under commissioners; right-hand side) and the control group (i.e. their 
‘nearest’ neighbor as derived from the matching procedure explained in section 3.2; left-hand side).  
 
  
Appendix A: Summary statistics 
 
 
 
Variable Obs Mean St.Dev. Min Max 
Dependent variables      
Education Politicians 
(average in local government) 39191 13.13 1.730 5.00 18.00 
Education Mayor 
(average in local government) 36711 15.85 2.95 5.00 18.00 
Education Aldermen 
(average in local government) 37523 13.15 2.65 5.00 18.00 
Education Councilors 
(average in local government) 38625 12.85 1.74 5.00 18.00 
Male  
(share in local government) 35790 0.911 0.157 0.14 1.00 
Entrepreneurs  
(share in local government) 37780 0.028 0.095 0.00 0.75 
Birth year  
(average in local government) 36623 1956.18 9.918 1909.30 1989.73 
 
Independent variables      
Before Commissioners 40518 0.042 0.200 0.00 1.00 
MafiaInfiltration 40366 0.096 0.295 0.00 1.00 
Multiple Mafia Dissolutions 40366 0.019 0.137 0.00 1.00 
Before Non-mafia Dissolution 40518 0.215 0.411 0.00 1.00 
Multiple Non-mafia Dissolutions 40518 0.119 0.324 0.00 1.00 
Population  40131 10352 36219.7 186 
100000
0 
Education municipality 40313 7.742 0.690 5.81 12.83 
Unemployment  municipality 40078 22.555 7.560 1.49 51.32 
Age Ratio  municipality 40078 128.44 62.083 22.05 574.29 
 
Granger Causality      
Mafia-related Homicides  270 8.933 19.937 0 146 
Education Politicians 275 13.69 0.578 12.71 15.97 
